This paper seeks to identify the appropriate form of a regional trading agreement in East Asia by estimating the intra-regional trade bias of various informal regional groups. The major conclusion is that ASEANϩ3 would be the natural policy choice for the formation of a regional trading agreement in East Asia. Moreover, ASEANϩ3 will not diverge from the principles of open regionalism and multilateralism, when we consider its inherently open character and the positive influence of the United States and Japan.
Introduction
With a second wave of regionalism sweeping the world, East Asian countries have come to acknowledge the need for some form of regional economic cooperation. Japan and Singapore recently concluded a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA), and various other forms of regional cooperation are being proposed in East Asia, such as those among ASEANϩ3 (ASEAN plus South Korea, Japan, and China) and ASEAN and China, as well as an FTA for China, Japan, and South Korea. However, there have been no serious efforts to answer the following questions: Which regional integration agreement is the most natural choice for East Asian countries from an economic perspective? Which regional integration agreements should East Asian countries pursue?
We start from the presumption that the institutionalization of a natural trading region, rather than the deliberate creation of preferential arrangements, would be more effective in accelerating trade among members because it would exploit existing economic and sociocultural connections, production networks, and other ties.
1 Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) introduced the concept of "natural trading partners," emphasizing two deªning criteria: close trade relations and geographical proximity. This concept of natural trading partners was popularized as "natural trading blocs" by Krugman (1991) , who emphasized the importance of geographical proximity.
In this paper, we focus on the empirical identiªcation of natural trading regions using the gravity model of Frankel (1997) . We test various combinations of regional groups as possible natural trading blocs, including the various pairings of China, Japan, and South Korea; China-Japan-South Korea; ASEAN; South Korea-ASEAN, China-ASEAN, and Japan-ASEAN; and ASEANϩ3 as a whole. We ªnd no evidence that the three Northeast Asian countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) form a natural trading bloc. In contrast, the tests suggest that ASEANϩ3 would be a natural choice for a regional trading agreement.
We explore further the characteristics of ASEANϩ3, focusing on two questions. The ªrst question is whether ASEANϩ3 is centered on Japan or the United States. The second question is whether there is any possibility that the informal ASEANϩ3 trading bloc is diverting trade with nonmembers. The evidence suggests that Japan and the United States serve together as centers for intra-regional trade. The evidence also shows that the creation of ASEANϩ3 as a formal trading bloc can be characterized as an example of nondiscriminatory market-driven integration.
Empirical framework and data

Analytical framework
The empirical framework proposed by Frankel (1997) for detecting and quantifying intra-regional trade bias is the gravity model, which captures not only the inºuences of geographical proximity and economic size on trade, but also the trade effects of formal trading blocs and informal relations. Our basic speciªcation is as follows:
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1 Natural trading regions have been conceptualized as "natural trading partners," "natural integration regions," or "market integration" by Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) , Lorenz (1992 Lorenz ( , 1993 , and Drysdale and Garnaut (1993) . These analysts argue that growth and efªciency in natural trading regions are likely to be greatly enhanced if they are supported by regional trade agreements. Intentionally creating a trading bloc is more costly because extra measures are required to create close common political and economic preferences, which are already present in a natural trading bloc.
where T ij is the bilateral volume of trade (imports) between importing (i) and exporting (j) countries, GDP i and GDP j are the importing (i) and exporting (j) countries' GDPs, TARIFF j indicates the average import tariff in country j and DISTANCE ij is the distance between countries i and j. Once the norm has been established by the gravity model, a dummy variable can be added to represent the case in which both countries in a given pair belong to the same regional trading bloc (either formal or informal). A statistically signiªcant positive coefªcient for the bloc dummy can be interpreted to mean that a trading bloc is forming naturally if there are no formal regional integration agreements.
There has been a long debate on the major reasons for regional trade concentration. Krugman (1991) and Summers (1991) point out that regional concentration in trade is attributable to geographical proximity, whereas Bhagwati (1992) and Panagariya (1995) emphasize "artiªcial" preferential trade policies as the dominant explanation for high trade concentration ratios. Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997) refer to the realworld situation between the two extremes of "natural" and "artiªcial" trade blocs as a "super-natural" bloc. Frankel (1997) uses the term "informal trading bloc" as a contrasting concept to the existing idea of a "formal trading bloc." In this paper, we focus on the existence of a regional trade bias; thus, the bloc dummy in our gravity equation represents all the regional trade biases: formal and artiªcial factors, geographic natural factors, and other unidentiªed natural factors. We faced some difªculties in obtaining bilateral tariff rates. Prewo (1978) provides annual bilateral tariff rates for 18 OECD countries for 1958 through 1974, and Deardorff and Stern (1990) also provide measures for pre-and post-Tokyo Round average tariff rates for 18 OECD countries. We could not obtain bilateral tariff rates for other countries, so we use the means of the national tariff rates given in the World Trade Organization's Integrated Data Base.
Are trading blocs forming in East Asia?
3.1 Do South Korea, Japan, and China constitute a regional trading bloc?
To test whether an informal regional trading bloc is forming in Northeast Asia, we estimate the gravity equation (a panel estimation using a random-effects model) to include a Northeast Asian bloc dummy in addition to contemporary regional trading blocs, such as the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and AFTA.
The estimation results are summarized in table 1. 4 We focus on the bloc effect. The coefªcient for the EU shows a statistically signiªcant level of 0.233 in 1990-2001 for the case of China-Japan-South Korea. The coefªcients for NAFTA and MERCOSUR are not statistically signiªcant for any years tested. The regional dummy of AFTA (ASEAN) exhibits a strong inward trade bias during 1990-2001. The coefªcient on the Northeast Asian dummy (China-Japan-South Korea) shows statistical signiªcance for this period at the 10 percent level. Thus, we ªnd weak evidence to sug-gest that a trading bloc is forming among the three Northeast Asian countries (column 2 of table 1). Table 2 tests whether there is any tendency toward a special trade bias in the three possible combinations of regional groupings in the Northeast Asian region: South Korea-Japan, South Korea-China, and China-Japan. None of the coefªcients on the regional trading bloc dummies shows statistical signiªcance in the panel estimation, corroborating the assertion that there is no regional trade bias among China, Japan, and South Korea. In other words, the trade relations between them can be simply explained with the gravity variables.
Does ASEAN 3 constitute a regional trading bloc?
This section investigates the existence of a regional trade bias within the boundary of ASEANϩ3. First, we add a new bloc dummy, ASEANϩ3, to the baseline model of table 1 and test whether a regional trading bloc is forming from the perspective of the ASEANϩ3 framework (table 3) . Second, we examine whether there is any ten- dency to promote regional trade between ASEAN as a whole and each of the three Northeast Asian countries, that is, South KoreaϩASEAN, JapanϩASEAN, and ChinaϩASEAN (table 4) . Table 3 shows that ASEANϩ3 has a signiªcant and apparent intra-regional trade bias in two models, with statistically signiªcant coefªcients in the models of 1.304 and 1.096, respectively. When we test for the effect of a China-Japan-South Korea bloc together with the ASEANϩ3 effect, the former effect disappears completely. We think that large differences between economic systems and development levels, as well as lack of experience in economic integration, are the biggest challenges for an FTA among these three countries.
Similarly, the coefªcient for the AFTA bloc does not show any statistical signiªcance when estimated with ASEANϩ3. These results are in line with the conclusion of Frankel and Wei (1996) that all of the increase in intra-Asian trade can be explained by the rapid growth of these economies, not by any special ASEAN effect. This is convincing when we consider that the three countries (South Korea, Japan, and be meaningless without the trade with its major Northeast Asian trading partners. The conclusion seems to be that China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN are in fact functioning as a trading bloc. nese, and Chinese networks are in place, as commonly believed, and they are competing for a close relationship with the ASEAN countries.
The characteristics and future of ASEAN 3
Are there special trade relations with Japan and the United States?
The East Asian economies are generally outward-oriented. The United States and Japan are major trading partners of particularly vital importance for the growth of East Asia. One question is whether a trading bloc is forming in East Asia that is centered on Japan and/or the United States. On the issue of regionalization centered on Japan, Frankel (1992) , using a separate dummy variable speciªcally for bilateral Asian trade with Japan, found little evidence in the regional trade patterns that Japan is transforming itself into a center of trade. In contrast, Choudhry, Abu-Bakar, and Wylie (2000), also using a simple gravity model of trade ºows within East Asian countries (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), concluded that East Asian intraregional trade centered on Japan goes beyond what can be explained by the gravity variables. Table 5 tests for the existence of special trade relations between ASEANϩ3 and Japan and between ASEANϩ3 and the United States by adding two separate dummy variables for the bilateral trade of countries in ASEANϩ3 with Japan and the United States, respectively. The coefªcient on the Japan dummy is statistically signiªcant at the 10 percent level, whereas that on the U.S. dummy is signiªcant at the 1 percent level. Hence, these results support the claim that ASEANϩ3 is centered on the United States and Japan together.
The increase in the intra-regional trade of ASEANϩ3 might arise from the fact that East Asian economies are highly dependent on the United States for their export markets. It is well known that East Asian countries have developed a low-cost production network in the region to achieve competitiveness in the world market and to export many products to other regions. Within this network, Japan provides countries in the region with capital and intermediate goods, thereby increasing regional trade. The potential for regional growth in trade in East Asia critically depends on growth in ªnal demand for East Asian products in other regions, particularly in North America. The signiªcant and positive economic ties between the United States and ASEANϩ3, on the one hand, and between Japan and ASEANϩ3, on the other, can be understood in this regard. At the same time, the weaker signiªcance of the Japan dummy, in comparison with the U.S. dummy, might reºect the fact that although Japan has constructed a production network in the ASEANϩ3 framework, there has been less than full demand within the region for a large part of those ªnal goods produced by that network.
Openness of ASEAN 3
We investigate whether there is economically important trade discrimination in ASEANϩ3. To capture the extra-bloc effects of ASEANϩ3, we introduce the openness dummy variable for each bloc, deªned by Frankel and Wei, which takes the value of 1 for the case of imports from all countries by member countries of bloc k. trade less with the rest of world than would be predicted, so a regional trade agreement among them might divert trade (Frankel and Wei 1996, 17) .
The results are summarized in table 6. The introduction of dummy variables for the openness of the blocs reduces the estimated effect of ASEANϩ3, but the coefªcient remains highly signiªcant statistically. In addition, the variable representing bloc openness of ASEANϩ3 shows signiªcantly positive values for the period 1990-2001. In contrast, the coefªcient on the openness dummy for NAFTA is not signiªcant, while that on the openness dummy for MERCOSUR is negative and signiªcant in the same period. After inclusion of the openness dummy for the EU, the coefªcient of the EU bloc dummy turns from statistically signiªcant into statistically insigniªcant, while the coefªcient of the openness dummy for the EU becomes positive and statistically signiªcant. These empirical results show little evidence of trade diversion resulting from an ASEANϩ3 bloc. Frankel and Wei (1996) test the bloc effect of "Asia Paciªc," which includes all the countries with eastern coasts on the Paciªc, including Australia and New Zealand. Their results show that the coefªcient and signiªcance level of this bloc are both higher than those of the East Asia dummy. They also broaden the bloc search and test for the formation of Asia-Paciªc Economic Cooperation (APEC), which includes the United States and Canada and other Paciªc economies. Frankel and Wei's results are as follows: the coefªcient of the APEC bloc dummy was highly signiªcant, whereas that of the Asia Paciªc dummy completely disappeared and that of the ASEANϩ3 dummy remained signiªcant. This implies that APEC would be the next alternative trading bloc for East Asian countries and that ASEANϩ3 would continue to function as a regional trading bloc even with the existence of a wider APEC bloc.
Widening ASEAN 3
evolution of ASEANϩ3 into a formal trading agreement would further promote and reinforce both intra-regional trade and inter-regional trade.
When we regard regionalization as a process of dynamic development of trade patterns by way of building gravity centers (following Lorenz 1992), it seems clear that a regional trade agreement among ASEANϩ3 countries would be the ªrst step for regionalization in East Asia. The provision of a formal institutional framework would help to stabilize the existing unidentiªed ties among ASEANϩ3 countries, such as production networks and sociocultural linkages, and accelerate further growth and efªciency in this region. Moreover, the creation of an ASEANϩ3 formal trading bloc would likely be deªned by market-driven integration (Drysdale and Garnaut 1993) . For a more successful and rapid development of the intra-regional market potential in East Asia, the creation of a formal regional trading bloc to advance the process of regionalization should now be considered.
